The Waiting ListWide moat

Ferrari (RACE) — moat facet

The waiting list is the product; the car is what eventually arrives.

The waiting list is the product. The car is what eventually arrives.

Shipments against revenue, 2023-H1 2026€5,970M2023 13,663 cars€6,677M2024 13,752 cars€7,146M2025 13,640 cars€3,786MH1 2026 6,802 carsCars: +89, then -112, then -285 year on year. Revenue: +11.8%, +7.0%, +6%.
Two consecutive reporting periods in which cars fell and revenue rose. That is the queue, stated as arithmetic.

Ferrari's controlled volume strategy is stated in its filing as a policy of "pursuing controlled growth and thereby preserving brand exclusivity," under which the company actively manages waiting lists to reach the optimal combination of exclusivity and client satisfaction.1 The order book, as of July 2026, "entirely covers 2027."2 A client ordering today waits into 2028; a client wanting a limited series may not be offered one at all.

What that does to the economics is worth spelling out, because it inverts almost every feature of the car industry. There is no discounting, because there is no unsold stock. There is no dealer inventory financing, no incentive spending, no model-year clearance. Demand exceeds supply by construction, so a recession shortens the queue rather than emptying the showroom — which is why Ferrari's revenue fell only 8% in 2020, the year it closed the factory, and recovered immediately.3

The cost is disclosed and real: "This focus on maintaining exclusivity limits our potential sales growth and profits."4 Ferrari has left money on the table every year since 1947 on purpose.

The discipline is also the fragile part. A queue is a stock of accumulated demand, and it can be spent. Every incremental car sold shortens it slightly, and Ferrari's own plan contemplates "a measured increase in shipments above current levels" as it targets a larger client base and a broader product range.5

The order book is the metric, and it is the one Ferrari discloses least precisely — a sentence on a call rather than a number in a table.

Moat trajectory: Holding steady

Shipments fell 0.8% in 2025 and 4.0% in the first half of 2026 while revenue rose in both, which is the queue working exactly as designed. Ferrari has not lengthened it and has not drawn it down.

The number that tests this moat
Reported
Shipments against revenue growth
13,640 cars, down 0.8% — revenue up 7.0%

And again in the first half of 2026: 6,802 cars against 7,087, down 4.0%, with revenue up 6% to €3,786M. Two consecutive reporting periods in which the lines moved in opposite directions is the queue doing its work. Watch for the year they move together in the wrong direction — falling shipments AND falling revenue would mean the waiting list had been drawn down rather than managed.

Source: Ferrari Form 20-F, FY2025 ↗
Aspects of the moat
DIG DEEPER 01
Exclusivity Limits Our Profits, and Ferrari Says So
Most risk factors describe something that might go wrong. This one describes a decision to earn less than the company could.
DIG DEEPER 02
You Do Not Buy a Ferrari; You Are Offered One
The reward for buying a Ferrari is the right to be offered another Ferrari — which is why loyalty here compounds instead of expiring.
DIG DEEPER 03
The Residual-Value Loop
A queue can only exist because the car at the end of it does not lose money, and that is a fact about the used market rather than the new one.
DIG DEEPER 04
No Discounts, No Stock, No Incentives
No dealer stock, no incentives, no discounts: what Ferrari does not have is worth more than most of what its rivals do.
⚠ Threats to the moat
⚠ THREAT 01
A Queue Is a Stock, Not an Income
A queue is a stock. Deliver against it faster than you replenish it and the moat is being consumed rather than earned.
⚠ THREAT 02
The Strategy Has Never Chosen in a Downturn
Ferrari has never had to choose between volume and price under real pressure, which means the discipline is untested rather than proven.
References
  1. ReportedFerrari's controlled volume strategy is stated in its filing as a policy of "pursuing controlled growth and thereby preserving brand exclusivity," under which the company actively manages waiting lists to reach the optimal combination of exclusivity and client satisfaction. The order book, as of July 2026, "entirely covers 2027." A client ordering today waits into 2028; a client wanting a limit...
    Ferrari N.V., second-quarter 2026 results press release (filed with the SEC as an exhibit to Form 6-K). Net revenues of EUR1,938M, up 8% and up 11% at constant currency; EBIT of EUR605M at a 31.2% margin, up 10% and up 16% at constant currency; EBITDA of EUR755M at a 39.0% margin; net profit of EUR463M; diluted earnings per share of EUR2.62; industrial free cash flow of EUR276M, up 39%. For the first half, net revenues of EUR3,786M (up 6%), EBIT of EUR1,153M at a 30.5% margin, net profit of EUR876M, diluted EPS of EUR4.95 and industrial free cash flow of EUR929M (up 14%). Second-quarter shipments totalled 3,366 cars against 3,494, with EMEA up 210 to 1,856, the Americas down 206 to 787, Greater China down 89 to 185 and the rest of Asia-Pacific down 43 to 538; first-half shipments were 6,802 against 7,087, with EMEA 3,314 (down 33), the Americas 1,817 (down 198), Greater China 440 (down 71) and the rest of Asia-Pacific 1,231 (up 17). Results were attributed to personalisations and mix, with deliveries of the 12Cilindri, 12Cilindri Spider, Purosangue and 296 Speciale families rising while the 296 GTS, Roma Spider and SF90 XX families phased out and the Amalfi and 849 Testarossa ramped; racing revenue rose on sponsorship and on the supply of power units to other Formula 1 teams. Full-year 2026 guidance was raised to net revenues of about EUR7.60bn from about EUR7.50bn, adjusted EBITDA of at least EUR2.97bn (at least 39.0% of revenue), adjusted EBIT of at least EUR2.26bn (at least 29.5%), adjusted diluted EPS of at least EUR9.68 and industrial free cash flow of at least EUR1.55bn, on stronger personalizations than initially expected and lower than anticipated currency headwinds, net of hedges. Chief executive Benedetto Vigna stated that the order book entirely covers 2027. More than EUR800M was returned during the quarter — a EUR599M dividend instalment and EUR209M of share repurchases — taking the company from net industrial cash of EUR388M at 31 March 2026 to net industrial debt of EUR131M at 30 June 2026. Trailing twelve-month figures to June 2026 are net revenues of EUR7,353M, net profit of EUR1,639M and diluted EPS of EUR9.23. — Q2 2026 · publ. 2026-07 · source ↗
  2. ReportedThe order book, as of July 2026, "entirely covers 2027." A client ordering today waits into 2028; a client wanting a limited series may not be offered one at all.
    Ferrari N.V., second-quarter 2026 results press release (filed with the SEC as an exhibit to Form 6-K). Net revenues of EUR1,938M, up 8% and up 11% at constant currency; EBIT of EUR605M at a 31.2% margin, up 10% and up 16% at constant currency; EBITDA of EUR755M at a 39.0% margin; net profit of EUR463M; diluted earnings per share of EUR2.62; industrial free cash flow of EUR276M, up 39%. For the first half, net revenues of EUR3,786M (up 6%), EBIT of EUR1,153M at a 30.5% margin, net profit of EUR876M, diluted EPS of EUR4.95 and industrial free cash flow of EUR929M (up 14%). Second-quarter shipments totalled 3,366 cars against 3,494, with EMEA up 210 to 1,856, the Americas down 206 to 787, Greater China down 89 to 185 and the rest of Asia-Pacific down 43 to 538; first-half shipments were 6,802 against 7,087, with EMEA 3,314 (down 33), the Americas 1,817 (down 198), Greater China 440 (down 71) and the rest of Asia-Pacific 1,231 (up 17). Results were attributed to personalisations and mix, with deliveries of the 12Cilindri, 12Cilindri Spider, Purosangue and 296 Speciale families rising while the 296 GTS, Roma Spider and SF90 XX families phased out and the Amalfi and 849 Testarossa ramped; racing revenue rose on sponsorship and on the supply of power units to other Formula 1 teams. Full-year 2026 guidance was raised to net revenues of about EUR7.60bn from about EUR7.50bn, adjusted EBITDA of at least EUR2.97bn (at least 39.0% of revenue), adjusted EBIT of at least EUR2.26bn (at least 29.5%), adjusted diluted EPS of at least EUR9.68 and industrial free cash flow of at least EUR1.55bn, on stronger personalizations than initially expected and lower than anticipated currency headwinds, net of hedges. Chief executive Benedetto Vigna stated that the order book entirely covers 2027. More than EUR800M was returned during the quarter — a EUR599M dividend instalment and EUR209M of share repurchases — taking the company from net industrial cash of EUR388M at 31 March 2026 to net industrial debt of EUR131M at 30 June 2026. Trailing twelve-month figures to June 2026 are net revenues of EUR7,353M, net profit of EUR1,639M and diluted EPS of EUR9.23. — Q2 2026 · publ. 2026-07 · source ↗
  3. ReportedDemand exceeds supply by construction, so a recession shortens the queue rather than emptying the showroom — which is why Ferrari's revenue fell only 8% in 2020, the year it closed the factory, and recovered immediately. The cost is disclosed and real: "This focus on maintaining exclusivity limits our potential sales growth and profits." Ferrari has left money on the table every year since 1947...
    Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 3.D, Risk Factors. The filing states that its focus on maintaining exclusivity limits its potential sales growth and profits. It warns that increasing production relative to the number of collectors may adversely affect the value of its cars as collectible items and their value in the secondary market, and that the resilience of the value of its cars after a period of ownership promotes repeat purchases. On personalisation, it warns that a higher level of personalization content may also adversely affect residual value, because personalized content generally depreciates substantially with change of ownership. On electrification, it states that electric technology is a core component of its strategy and that if the introduction of such technology proves too costly or is unsuccessful in the market its results of operations could be materially adversely affected, and that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it; it also warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may adversely affect residual values if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars. Additional risk factors address dependence on a single production site in Maranello, the performance of independent dealers, and the risk that the interests of its largest shareholders may differ from those of other shareholders. Among the named risks and uncertainties are the success of its racing activities, and the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities as well as the popularity of motor sports more broadly. The filing states that revenues from sponsorship, commercial and brand activities are influenced by the strength and appeal of the brand, the historical success and current performance of its racing teams through Scuderia Ferrari in the FIA Formula 1 World Championship and the Ferrari Endurance Team in the World Endurance Championship, and the overall popularity of Formula 1 and other racing competitions. — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗
  4. ReportedThe cost is disclosed and real: "This focus on maintaining exclusivity limits our potential sales growth and profits." Ferrari has left money on the table every year since 1947 on purpose.
    Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 3.D, Risk Factors. The filing states that its focus on maintaining exclusivity limits its potential sales growth and profits. It warns that increasing production relative to the number of collectors may adversely affect the value of its cars as collectible items and their value in the secondary market, and that the resilience of the value of its cars after a period of ownership promotes repeat purchases. On personalisation, it warns that a higher level of personalization content may also adversely affect residual value, because personalized content generally depreciates substantially with change of ownership. On electrification, it states that electric technology is a core component of its strategy and that if the introduction of such technology proves too costly or is unsuccessful in the market its results of operations could be materially adversely affected, and that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it; it also warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may adversely affect residual values if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars. Additional risk factors address dependence on a single production site in Maranello, the performance of independent dealers, and the risk that the interests of its largest shareholders may differ from those of other shareholders. Among the named risks and uncertainties are the success of its racing activities, and the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities as well as the popularity of motor sports more broadly. The filing states that revenues from sponsorship, commercial and brand activities are influenced by the strength and appeal of the brand, the historical success and current performance of its racing teams through Scuderia Ferrari in the FIA Formula 1 World Championship and the Ferrari Endurance Team in the World Endurance Championship, and the overall popularity of Formula 1 and other racing competitions. — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗
  5. ReportedEvery incremental car sold shortens it slightly, and Ferrari's own plan contemplates "a measured increase in shipments above current levels" as it targets a larger client base and a broader product range. The order book is the metric, and it is the one Ferrari discloses least precisely — a sentence on a call rather than a number in a table.
    Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 4, sales and distribution, client management and the controlled volume strategy. Ferrari sells in over 60 markets through a network of 181 authorized dealers operating 195 points of sale as of the end of 2025; its largest dealer accounted for approximately 3.0% of shipments in 2025 and its fifteen largest dealers for approximately 25%. As part of supply and demand management, allocations are determined by geography and by dealer based on various metrics including expected developments in the relevant market, the number of cars sold historically by the various dealers, the current order book of dealers and the average waiting time of the end client in the relevant market; an order reporting system allows Ferrari to collect and monitor information regarding end client orders and assists in production planning, allocation and dealer management. Ferrari relentlessly focuses on preserving product exclusivity and nurturing its client community, rewarding loyal clients through driving events and other initiatives and, most importantly, offering its most loyal and active clients preferential access to its newest, most exclusive and highest value cars. Competition among similarly positioned luxury performance cars is driven by price and total cost of ownership, and the filing states that resilience of the car value after a period of ownership is an important competitive dimension because higher resilience decreases the total cost of ownership and promotes repeat purchases, which Ferrari believes is a strong competitive advantage. Its controlled volume strategy contemplates a measured increase in shipments above current levels as it targets a larger customer base and modes of use, increases its focus on periodically rejuvenating its customer base and creating new Ferrari collectors, and its product portfolio evolves with a broader product range. It sold 13,640, 13,752 and 13,663 cars in 2025, 2024 and 2023. — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗
Sources
Generated September 23, 2026