⚠ A Revenue Line Inside a Sport Ferrari Does Not ControlModerate threat
Ferrari (RACE) — threat to the moat
Ferrari's fastest-growing revenue line sits inside a sport whose commercial terms it negotiates alongside nine rivals.
Formula 1 is a revenue line that depends on a sport Ferrari does not control.
Ferrari's risk factors name it directly: the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities, and the popularity of motor sports more broadly.1 The commercial share Ferrari receives is set by agreements with the sport's commercial rights holder, renegotiated periodically, and the sponsorship revenue depends on brands wanting to be on the car.
The structural risk is not results — Ferrari went from 2008 to the present without a drivers' championship and its road-car business compounded throughout, which is the strongest evidence available that clients are not buying the podium. The risk is the sport's economics: a changed revenue-distribution formula, a cost cap that alters the competitive shape, or a decline in audience.
There is also a cost side rarely discussed. Selling, general and administrative costs rose 14.5% to €642 million in 2025 — 9.0% of revenue against 8.4% — attributed primarily to racing expenses and brand investments, which is the programme consuming margin in the same years it generates revenue.2
Watch the sponsorship line against the racing cost commentary, which Ferrari gives qualitatively in every guidance revision.
- ReportedFerrari's risk factors name it directly: the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities, and the popularity of motor sports more broadly. The commercial share Ferrari receives is set by agreements with the sport's commercial rights holder, renegotiated periodically, and the sponsorship revenue depends on brands wanting to be on the car.Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 3.D, Risk Factors. The filing states that its focus on maintaining exclusivity limits its potential sales growth and profits. It warns that increasing production relative to the number of collectors may adversely affect the value of its cars as collectible items and their value in the secondary market, and that the resilience of the value of its cars after a period of ownership promotes repeat purchases. On personalisation, it warns that a higher level of personalization content may also adversely affect residual value, because personalized content generally depreciates substantially with change of ownership. On electrification, it states that electric technology is a core component of its strategy and that if the introduction of such technology proves too costly or is unsuccessful in the market its results of operations could be materially adversely affected, and that other manufacturers of luxury sports cars may be more successful at implementing it; it also warns that the shift to hybrid and electric models may adversely affect residual values if secondary sales occur at wider discounts than for combustion cars. Additional risk factors address dependence on a single production site in Maranello, the performance of independent dealers, and the risk that the interests of its largest shareholders may differ from those of other shareholders. Among the named risks and uncertainties are the success of its racing activities, and the sponsorship and commercial revenues and expenses of its racing activities as well as the popularity of motor sports more broadly. The filing states that revenues from sponsorship, commercial and brand activities are influenced by the strength and appeal of the brand, the historical success and current performance of its racing teams through Scuderia Ferrari in the FIA Formula 1 World Championship and the Ferrari Endurance Team in the World Endurance Championship, and the overall popularity of Formula 1 and other racing competitions. — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗
- Moat Explorer calcSelling, general and administrative costs rose 14.5% to €642 million in 2025 — 9.0% of revenue against 8.4% — attributed primarily to racing expenses and brand investments, which is the programme consuming margin in the same years it generates revenue. Watch the sponsorship line against the racing cost commentary, which Ferrari gives qualitatively in every guidance revision.Ferrari N.V., Form 20-F FY2025 — Item 5, Operating and Financial Review. Total shipments of 13,640 cars against 13,752 in 2024 and 13,663 in 2023; shipment figures exclude strictly limited racing cars such as those in the XX Programme and the 499P Modificata, as well as one-off, pre-owned and other special sales. Net revenues of EUR7,146M, up 7.0%. Net revenues from cars and spare parts were EUR6,005M, an increase of EUR277M or 4.8% on EUR5,728M in 2024 and EUR5,119M in 2023, attributed primarily to a richer product and country mix as well as a higher contribution from personalization, more than offsetting the lower contribution from the Daytona SP3 whose limited series deliveries concluded in the third quarter of 2025; foreign currency effects including hedging were negative. Sponsorship, commercial and brand revenues were EUR820M, up 22.4% from EUR670M and EUR572M in the two prior years, comprising sponsorship of Scuderia Ferrari, Ferrari share of the Formula 1 World Championship commercial revenues distributed to teams, and lifestyle, merchandising, licensing and royalty income; other net revenues were EUR321M, up EUR42M. Selling, general and administrative costs were EUR642M in 2025, an increase of EUR81M or 14.5% on EUR561M, and 9.0% of net revenues against 8.4%, attributed primarily to racing expenses and brand investments as well as organizational development. Net revenues by year run EUR3,105M (2016), EUR3,417M, EUR3,420M, EUR3,766M, EUR3,460M (2020), EUR4,271M, EUR5,095M, EUR5,970M, EUR6,677M and EUR7,146M (2025). — FY2025 · publ. 2026-02 · source ↗