Major ClientsThin moat

Nvidia's customer concentration is the most extreme in this collection, and it got dramatically worse in a single year. In fiscal 2026 one direct customer accounted for 22% of total revenue and another for 14% — 36% from two buyers¹. A year earlier the largest was 12% and two others 11% each. Nvidia's own filing states plainly that revenue is concentrated among a limited number of customers and that the trend may continue.

Then comes the quirk that makes this page worth reading. Nvidia does not name those customers, and they are probably not the companies you would guess. Its direct customers are largely the OEMs, ODMs, distributors and system integrators who assemble and resell the hardware. The famous names — the cloud providers, the neocloud builders, the model labs — are mostly indirect customers who buy through those channels, and Nvidia says it estimates some of them individually exceed 10% of revenue too.

Read through the channel and the real picture is this: hyperscalers supplied 55% of data-center revenue in the latest quarter, down from 59% a year earlier, with the rest spread across AI clouds, enterprises, sovereign projects and industry². Those are the buyers who matter, and the uncomfortable fact — treated in full on this company's root threat page — is that the four largest of them are each building accelerators of their own.

Set against Apple's page of the same name, the contrast is close to total: Apple has no customer worth naming and sells to hundreds of millions of individuals who cannot negotiate. Nvidia sells to a few dozen organisations that can negotiate, are building substitutes, and in several cases are financed by Nvidia itself. The pages that follow take the concentration, the channel, the hyperscalers and the labs in turn.