✦ Giving the Money BackNarrow moat

StoneCo (STNE) — the future bets

Returning a quarter of your market value in a year says management thinks the shares are the best asset available — buybacks only create value if that's true.

The least conventional bet on this page is that StoneCo's best investment is StoneCo. Year-to-date capital returned to shareholders reached about R$3.6 billion — a distribution yield around 27% — funded partly by the proceeds of the Linx software divestiture2 and including roughly R$0.6 billion of ordinary buybacks1.

Capital returned year to date (R$ bn)R$0.6BOrdinary buybacksR$3.6BTotal returnedA ~27% distribution yield, funded partly by the Linx divestiture to TOTVS
A quarter of the market value handed back in a year is management saying the shares are the best investment it can find — a claim the multiple will eventually test.

Returning a quarter of your market value in a single year is an unusual statement. It says management believes the shares are badly mispriced, that the business generates more cash than its growth opportunities can absorb, and — after the Linx experience — that shrinking the share count is a better use of capital than buying another company. For a business trading at a mid-single-digit earnings multiple, the arithmetic is hard to argue with: every real spent on buybacks retires earnings at a yield no operating project easily matches.

The caution is that buybacks are not a strategy, and a distribution funded in part by asset sales cannot repeat indefinitely. There is also a version of this story where heavy returns signal a management with nothing better to do in a market that is structurally compressing. Watch the share count actually falling, watch what proportion of future distributions comes from operating cash rather than divestitures, and watch whether the multiple ever responds. Buying back cheap shares only creates value if the shares were genuinely cheap.

Moat trajectory: Holding steady

Retiring shares this cheaply is rational and the yield is extraordinary, but distributions funded partly by asset sales cannot repeat indefinitely, and buybacks do not improve the business. Holding steady until the share count visibly falls and the distribution is carried by operating cash rather than divestiture proceeds.

The number that tests this moat
Reported
Share buybacks in the twelve months to June 2026
R$3.0bn, cutting the share count by 40.3 million

Buybacks lifted EPS 8.6% while net income fell 2.6%; the question is how long cash returns can outrun earnings.

Source: StoneCo second-quarter 2026 earnings release (13 August 2026) ↗
References
  1. Reported~R$3.6B returned to shareholders year to date — a ~27% distribution yield — including ~R$0.6B of ordinary buybacks.
    StoneCo Q2 2026 earnings release and call — credit portfolio more than doubled to ~R$3.8B on working-capital and government-backed lending, retail deposits +20% to ~R$10.8B; cost of risk 21.5% with guidance toward the mid-to-high teens by year-end; FY2026 guidance of R$6.6-7.0B adjusted gross profit and R$10.80-11.40 adjusted basic EPS, tracking the lower end; every 100bps of Selic carries ~R$200-250M of pre-tax impact; ~R$3.6B of capital returned year to date (~27% distribution yield) including ~R$0.6B of ordinary buybacks — Q2 2026 · publ. August 2026 · source ↗
  2. ReportedPart of the distribution was funded by the Linx software divestiture to TOTVS (enterprise value R$3.05B).
    StoneCo announcement — divestment of Linx and certain other software assets to TOTVS for an enterprise value of R$3.05B plus an estimated R$360M net cash position — 2025-2026 · publ. 2025 · source ↗
Sources
Generated September 23, 2026