Aladdin's Clients Are the CompetitionWide moat
BlackRock (BLK) — moat facet
The strongest switching cost in the firm, attached to the customers with the least reason to be happy about it.
The technology business sells to insurance companies, pension funds, banks, wealth platforms and other asset managers. That last category is what makes it remarkable: firms competing with BlackRock for mandates run those mandates on BlackRock's system, and pay for the privilege.
It earned $1,981 million in 2025, up 24%, with annual contract value growing 31% including Preqin and 16% without1. The revenue is contracted and recurring, and it does not move with markets — which in a company where the rest of the revenue is a percentage of asset values makes it worth more than its 8% share of the total suggests.
The relationship is genuinely different from every other client relationship in the firm. An asset management client can leave at the end of a notice period. A technology client is embedded: the platform is the book of record, the risk system, the trade processing and the reporting, and replacing it takes years and threatens continuity of the client's own operations. That is the strongest switching cost BlackRock has anywhere.
It is also the relationship with the most structural tension. Every one of these clients would prefer, all else equal, not to depend on a competitor for critical infrastructure — and the tension is sharper still in private markets, where Preqin's data covers deals that BlackRock's own funds bid on.
Rated wide, on the switching cost, with the caveat that the moat here is captivity rather than affection. The clients stay because leaving is hard, and a competitor with a genuinely better product would eventually be worth the pain.
Contract value grew 31% and the platform now spans public and private markets in a way no competitor matches. The tension with the customers is permanent and has not yet cost a major relationship.
Sold to insurers, banks, pension funds, wealth platforms and competing asset managers. The switching cost is the strongest in the firm; the customer's structural preference runs against BlackRock, which is why organic growth is the number that matters.
Source: BlackRock Form 10-K, fiscal year 2025 ↗- ReportedIt earned $1,981 million in 2025, up 24%, with annual contract value growing 31% including Preqin and 16% withoutBlackRock, Inc. Form 10-K, FY2025, MD&A — total revenue $24,216M against $20,407M in 2024; base fees and securities lending $19,179M against $16,100M, including securities lending revenue of $705M against $615M; performance fees $1,424M against $1,207M, of which private markets $695M against $308M and liquid alternatives $558M against $680M; technology services and subscription revenue $1,981M against $1,603M, an increase of $378M "reflecting the sustained demand for Aladdin technology offerings and approximately $210 million of revenue related to the Preqin Transaction"; distribution fees $1,355M; advisory and other revenue $277M; annual contract value growth of 31% including Preqin and 16% excluding it; employee compensation and benefits $8,446M — FY2025 · publ. February 2026 · source ↗