Major ClientsWide moat
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.B) — moat facet
Berkshire sells nothing; it has four counterparty relationships instead, and in the most important one the customer is choosing the buyer.
Berkshire has no customers in the ordinary sense, because Berkshire does not sell anything. Its subsidiaries do — insurance, rail freight, electricity, bricks, furniture, ice cream — to customer bases that share nothing at all. What the parent company has instead are four groups of counterparties, each in a relationship that would look strange at any other company.
The most important are the families who sell it their businesses. Berkshire's growth depends on private owners choosing it over a higher bidder, which is a customer relationship in reverse: the seller is choosing the buyer, and the product Berkshire offers is what happens after the sale. The second are policyholders, who hand Berkshire money years before it is paid out and thereby fund $177.5 billion of investable float1 — customers who pay for the privilege of lending.
The third group is captive by regulation rather than by choice: the shippers who must move freight by rail and the households served by Berkshire Hathaway Energy's utilities, both operating in markets where prices are set by regulators rather than negotiated. And the fourth are the shareholders, who are unusual among public-company owners in receiving no dividend at all — they are paid in retained earnings and asked to trust the reinvestment.
The number that ties them together is operating earnings, roughly $47 billion a year. Every one of these relationships exists to feed that figure, and it is the only measure by which the whole arrangement can be judged.
All four relationships are intact and none improved. Sellers still come, though the first Abel-era test is only beginning; float is at record levels; the regulated customers are as captive as ever; and shareholders continue to accept retained earnings. The one thing worth watching is whether the reinvestment promise made to those shareholders can still be kept at this size.
Policyholders fund the float and underwriting profit. A share falling below a third would mean lower rates and softer auto pricing are shrinking the most important customer relationship.
- ReportedThe second are policyholders, who hand Berkshire money years before it is paid out and thereby fund $177.5 billion of investable float — customers who pay for the privilege of lending.Berkshire Hathaway Form 10-Q, quarter ended 30 June 2026 - after-tax earnings (underwriting $1,731M vs $1,992M, insurance investment income $3,059M vs $3,367M, BNSF $1,558M vs $1,466M, BHE $891M vs $702M, manufacturing, service and retailing $4,470M vs $3,601M, investment gains $12,684M, net earnings $25,667M); GEICO pre-tax underwriting $994M vs $1,821M, combined ratio 91.2% vs 83.5%; Reinsurance $913M vs $650M; float $177.5B; insurance and other cash and Treasury Bills net $359.2B; consolidated cash $35,096M + $324,905M + $5,513M; equity securities $323.8B; H1 purchases of equities $39.4B and sales $27.8B; acquisitions of businesses net of cash $9.7B; $4.8B of treasury stock acquired in H1, most in Q2; OxyChem about $9.4B on 2 January; Taylor Morrison agreed 31 May at $72.50 a share, about $6.8B, closed 24 July; notes payable of insurance and other $43.3B; shareholders' equity $747.9B; BNSF revenue $6,601M vs $5,769M, fuel $1,173M vs $698M; BHE revenue $6,735M vs $6,418M; investment income down 9.1% on lower interest rates — Q2 2026 · publ. August 2026 · source ↗
- Berkshire Hathaway Form 10-K filings — Business & Risk Factors (SEC EDGAR)
- Berkshire Hathaway quarterly report — float, cash and operating earnings